Popular Rentierism and Tourism Development in Kuwait by PARIS, CODY & RUBIN, SIMON
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Travel and Tourism Research Association:
Advancing Tourism Research Globally 2013 ttra International Conference
Popular Rentierism and Tourism Development in
Kuwait
CODY PARIS
School of Law Middlesex University Dubai
SIMON RUBIN
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/ttra
This Event is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Travel and Tourism
Research Association: Advancing Tourism Research Globally by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
PARIS, CODY and RUBIN, SIMON, "Popular Rentierism and Tourism Development in Kuwait" (2016). Travel and Tourism Research
Association: Advancing Tourism Research Globally. 12.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/ttra/2013/AcademicPapers_Visual/12
Popular Rentierism and Tourism Development in Kuwait 
 
 
Cody Morris Paris 
School of Law 
Middlesex University Dubai 
 
and 
 
Simon Rubin 
Freelance Tourism Researcher 
 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the challenges facing tourism development in 
Kuwait due to the particularly unique political-economic system of ‘popular’ rentierism. 
Kuwait’s tourism industry is relatively underdeveloped in comparison to other GCC countries 
and has not received much attention in the academic tourism literature. While insights of from 
this study will be useful for understanding the role of tourism in the rentier economies, this paper 
will also help to further theorize tourism within the field of political science and international 
political economy. This study provides both a macro-level analysis of the political economic 
obstacles to tourism development in Kuwait and the more micro-level challenges that have 
resulted, particularly in relation to mega-development projects, such as the $3.3 billion dollar 
Failaka Island development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the challenges facing tourism development in 
Kuwait due to the particularly unique political-economic system of ‘popular’ rentierism. 
Kuwait’s tourism industry is relatively underdeveloped in comparison to other GCC countries 
and has not received much attention in the academic tourism literature. The paper is based upon 
field work in Kuwait and the examination of secondary resources including academic literature, 
media, and government documents. While insights of from this study will be useful for 
understanding the role of tourism in the rentier economies, this paper will also help to further 
theorize tourism within the field of political science and international political economy. 
Additionally this paper attempts to address a deficit in the literature, as noted by Bianchi (2004) , 
“What many of these…Political economy analyses of international tourism had in common was 
their overly generalized view of macro-structural processes… whilst crucial aspects of 
local/regional economic development were certainly overlooked and under-theorized” (p. 271).  
This study provides both a macro-level analysis of the political economic obstacles to tourism 
development in Kuwait and the more micro-level challenges that have resulted, particularly in 
relation to mega-development projects, such as the $3.3 billion dollar Failaka Island 
development.  
 
CURRENT STATE OF TOURISM IN KUWAIT 
 
There are many obstacles facing the future development of tourism in Kuwait including 
the lack of tourism infrastructure, attractions, and a challenging environment for private industry.  
Recently, there has been renewed focus on developing the tourism industry in Kuwait as part of a 
wider economic diversification strategy meant to reduce the dependence on the oil revenue that 
makes up the majority of the GDP.  This new focus on tourism, however, is met with certain 
challenges and opportunities. Perhaps the most pressing obstacles related to the revitalization of 
tourism in Kuwait are the country’s relationship and proximity to Iraq. Although the 1990 Gulf 
War is long over, tension between the countries is still high, especially with Iraq’s current 
political instability (Alsdirawi & Faraj, 2004). This, in addition to a heavily guarded 
demilitarized zone along the 240 km border, gives potential visitors a negative perception of 
safety in Kuwait. Another obstacle for Kuwait’s tourism industry is the lack of attractions for 
tourists. The visitation to Kuwait has been relatively low over the past decades due to inaction by 
the government to promote international tourism (Alhemoud & Armstrong, 1996). In one of the 
only academic tourism papers on tourism in Kuwait, Alhemoud & Armstrong (1996) concluded, 
in a study of university students and English-speaking foreigners in Kuwait, that neither group 
was very impressed by the country’s tourist attractions, man-made or natural. 
 
Kuwait’s tourism is relatively underdeveloped in comparison to other GCC countries.  In 
2011, Kuwait ranked 61st globally with 362,000 tourists, which is expected to grow to about 
639,000 by 2021.  Some government officials have actually stated that the aim is to attract one 
million visitors within five years (Kiesnoski, 2011).  In 2009, Tourism contributed USD 535 
Million, accounting for 0.88% of the country’s exports. While the total tourism receipts have 
increased, the percentage of the country’s exports represented by the tourism industry has 
decreased from 4% in 1998, likely a result of the September 11th attacks and subsequent war in 
Iraq.  While the number of international tourists are quite low in comparison to other top 
destinations in the region, there are a large number of international day 'visitors'. According to 
Kuwait Tourism, about 82% of the nearly 3.8 million International visitors only stay for the day 
and spend less than $100 per person (Kiesnoski, 2011). The international inbound tourist arrival 
numbers are in stark contrast to the outgoing tourism market. In 2007 there were 2.7 million 
outbound tourists from Kuwait. The outbound tourists spent USD 8.2 billion, which accounted 
for nearly 27% of the country’s imports. The scale of this outbound market suggests that there is 
a huge amount of untapped potential for growth in the domestic tourism industry.  There is a 
long tradition of domestic leisure and recreational activities in Kuwait. Many Kuwaiti families 
construct short-term tents in large camping communities in the desert during the winter months. 
During these cooler months, many Kuwaiti’s spend weekends or evenings in these tents, many of 
which are furnished with all the comforts of home.  Additionally, there is large number of beach 
chalets, where Kuwaiti’s spend time pursuing leisure activities.  Recreational activities including 
four-wheeling, jet skiing, boating, fishing, horseback riding, falconry, are all quite popular. The 
traditional pursuit of these activities combined with the large number of outbound tourism from 
Kuwait suggest that there is a huge potential for capturing the domestic tourism industry.  
 
Since 2004, there has been a large development push in the tourism and hospitality 
industry. Twenty-five hotels and resorts have been built or are planned by international brands 
including Hilton, Four Seasons, Jumeirah and Intercontinental.  The massive increase in hotel 
beds combined with the planned hotel and resort components of the mega-developments ($85 
billion City of Silk, $3.3 billion Failaka Island) will provide the need for the development of 
attractions to draw leisure tourists to Kuwait. Currently the market is largely made up of business 
tourists, most of whom are connected to the US military operations in Iraq and the energy sector. 
While Kuwait has relaxed visa procedures for certain regions (e.g., GCC, North America, 
Australia, and most of Western Europe) (Stensgaard, 2004), visitors from other regions still have 
to deal with often complicated and tedious procedures (al-Shamari, 2011). 
 
The country’s accessibility and mild climate during the spring and winter months provide 
some of the necessary draw for international tourists. There are also some unique attractions for 
visitors including the iconic Kuwait Towers, the Liberation Tower, Old Souk and Grand 
Mosque, the waterfront Corniche, and an array of beautiful beaches. Kuwait’s Tourism website 
also includes several other attractions for visitors go to including amusement parks, ice skating 
rink, swimming pool complex, resorts, yacht clubs, parks, and Green Island, the first artificial 
island in the Gulf region (Touristic Enterprises Company, http://www.kuwaittourism.com).  
Kuwait also offers visitors a unique and arguably better opportunity for experiencing authentic 
cultural experiences and interactions with the local population.  As one travel agent in California 
stated, “every single time we’ve ended the Persian Gulf route and our clients reminisce, they 
mention Kuwait as a highlight. It may not have all the glitz and glamour, but they were so glad 
they visited” (Kiesnoski, 2011). The relative lack of tourism development in Kuwait can create 
the perception of being a more authentic destination, that is off-the-beaten track or exotic.  As a 
tour operator quoted by Kenneth Kiesnoski (2011) suggests, “Kuwait has something different to 
offer. Sometimes the lack of development is an attraction unto itself and the lesser-known 
regions often end up being the highlights of one’s travels.”  While the lack of attractions provide 
some visitors with a positive feeling, it leaves very little for the tourism industry in Kuwait to 
work with to market or brand the destination, particularly to international long-haul tourists. 
Kuwait lacks the iconic attractions from antiquity as in Jordan and Egypt, the modern attractions 
of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, or the natural beauty of destinations like Oman.  
 
Additionally, the ban on alcohol means that Kuwait lacks the nightlife that other 
destinations in the Gulf have, a potential disincentive for many leisure tourists.  On the other 
hand, some in the tourist industry point to the lack of coordinated marketing initiatives and lack 
of governmental support of the tourism industry as the main obstacles for increasing the number 
of international tourists and keeping domestic tourists in Kuwait (Kiesnoski, 2011; al-Shamari, 
2011).  The tourism sector in Kuwait is handled by a small division in the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, and not by a separate ministry or board. This means that any international 
promotional activity and campaigns, such as the ITB in Berlin or the World Travel Market in 
London are supported by the private sector entities such as Kuwait Airways, the tourism operator 
Kuwait Tourism Services, and the Kuwait Hotel Owners Association. Essentially, many in the 
private sector feel that the tourism industry is treated with indifference by the government. As 
one CEO and hotel owner stated, “In the government no one listens to us or gives us feedback. 
For 25 years, we’ve been fighting for recognition, but they’re not supporting us. We just want 
the government to recognize us as an industry” (Kiesnoski, 2011).  This lack of support reflects 
the ongoing challenges for private businesses in Kuwait, and the general lack of support for non-
oil related economic activities during the last few decades.  The National Assembly non-support 
for the private sector, and specifically tourism, can be seen as a reflection of the wider 
indifference of Kuwaitis. This is arguably changing, as many Kuwaitis have recognized the need 
for economic reforms and diversification of the economy, and thus the recent expansion of the 
hospitality industry and the recent general economic reforms suggest that there is a shift in the 
perception of the tourism industry’s role in securing the economic future of the country.   
 
In March of 2011, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Commerce drafted a tourist strategy to 
stimulate tourism so that it can provide a viable source of income to the country. The strategy 
includes the implementation of an external marketing plan and a detailed map of all tourist 
facilities in Kuwait (al-Shamari, 2011).  A former under-secretary for tourism suggests that 
Kuwait “needs to offer more touristic and recreational facilities than what is has now and a 
comprehensive marketing plan that begins by informing citizens and residents of Kuwait about 
what is available in Kuwait before marketing it abroad” (al-Shamari, 2011).  . This emphasis on 
creating awareness domestically can have two important impacts on the future of the industry. 
First, it can help to, according to the current under-secretary of tourism in the Ministry of 
Tourism, “build awareness about domestic tourism to Kuwatis who travel abroad every week. 
We want to encourage them to go to Kuwait Islands, which could be a tourist attraction” (al-
Shamari, 2011).   Second, by creating awareness among the population, there might be larger 
support for pro-tourism activity by the elected officials in the National Assembly.  The next 
sections explore the political economy of Kuwait and the current economic reforms and 
development plans in Kuwait in more detail. These provide a foundation for understanding the 
context of future tourism development in Kuwait.       
 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KUWAIT 
 
Rentier theory emerged from analysis of the political economy of the oil-dependent GCC 
countries. A rentier state can be defined as a state in which the government is a primary 
economic player and uses its ‘legitimate’ monopoly over a geographic area to extract significant 
rents from international transactions (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987).  Since a significant share of the 
rentier state’s revenue is derived from the rents imposed on international transactions, the state is 
freed from the need to extract internal revenues through taxation on the domestic economy 
(Jenkins, Meyer, Costello, & Aly, 2011).  While rents derived from energy resources are the 
most commonly examined, rents can be derived from other sources including: other natural 
resources, foreign grants/soft loans, and worker remittances. Additionally, income from 
international tourism based on the use of unique natural or cultural attractions are also examples 
(Richter & Steiner, 2008). The relationship between tourism and rentierism has only just recently 
been explored, and none of which have explored the unique relationship between ‘popular 
rentierism’ (Yom, 2011) and tourism as is the case in Kuwait. Mansfeld and Winckler have 
examined the overall challenges of tourism development as a long-term economic alternative to 
oil-based rentier economies in the GCC using the example of Dubai (2007) and Bahrain (2008). 
Additionally, Richter and Steiner (2008) examined the neo-patrimonial rentier state of Egypt and 
argued that the transformations that occurred over the last few decades have resulted in a 
diversification of external rents instead of an overall downsizing of the rentier character of the 
Egyptian economy.  
 
After the oil crisis in the 1990s, many of the GCC nations started to move towards 
diversification, privatization, liberalization and deregulation in order to support long-term 
economic growth, and the development of the tourism industry is a central component to these 
strategies.  Within the GCC, tourism has been a main focal point of economic diversification 
strategies. Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar are good examples of this strategy in action. Overall the 
development of the tourism industry in Kuwait can be seen as a failure in comparison. While 
there have been several attempts expand international and domestic tourism in Kuwait, mostly 
from the private sector, the overall political and economic landscape in Kuwait has resulted in 
several major challenges for the future development of tourism industry. In particular, there is a 
lack of public-private partnerships (Hvidt, 2007) and state owned enterprises (Hertog, 2010), 
which have been instrumental for the development of the tourism industry (and in particular 
infrastructure) in places like Dubai. 
 
The need for these wide ranging economic reforms have been recognized by policy and 
business leaders, it has been particularly slow among the oil-rich Gulf States and the Middle East 
more generally, when compared to other parts of the world (Hvidt, 2007).  While some places 
like Dubai have seen recent ‘booms’ in development resulting from economic diversification and 
an efficient form of state-sponsored capitalism, Kuwait has not. Herb (2009) suggests that 
Kuwait has developed a reputation as a challenging place for business.  Inward foreign direct 
investment in Kuwait lags way behind the rest of the GCC. During the last 50 years the increase 
oil revenues have led to the development of an ‘allocation state’ (Luciani, 1990) in Kuwait, 
where oil revenues are redistributed to citizens thus decreasing the interdependence of the private 
sector and government (Hvidt, 2007). 
 
Kuwait’s economy can be considered an extreme form of rentierism, in which the 
majority of the economic activity is based on the oil industry.  While other rentier states in the 
region have been able to successfully adopt economic diversification strategies, the unique form 
of ‘popular’ rentierism (Yom, 2011) has created challenging conditions for economic 
development and diversification. Kuwait’s popular rentier system combines characteristics of 
other Gulf rentier states with the uniquely participatory political system that is responsive to 
internal social forces and the vulnerability and influence of external relations (Gray, 2011). 
Formal and informal political participation in Kuwait is tied to unique historical roots that 
differentiate from other Gulf States, and thus the relatively democratic political system has been 
stained despite the rentier system (Segal, 2012). 
 
Kuwait has the strongest parliament in the GCC, whereby the parliament is able to vote 
no confidence in individual ministers. The parliament is made up of individuals elected through 
free and fair elections and there is nearly universal adult suffrage17. The parliament’s power thus 
results in the ruling family appointing ministers who are responsive to the parliament and avoid 
offending the majority within parliament. As a result the structure of the Kuwaiti political system 
tends to support political deadlock.  Thus, many of the large scale economic reforms or 
infrastructure projects are held up by the political system.   
 
The private sector in Kuwait often places the blame for the economic problems at the 
country on the National Assembly. As one Kuwaiti economist said, “Kuwait has adopted the 
worst of democracy and the worst of dictatorship, the country lives on oil revenues, which makes 
it a temporary country” (Herb, 2009: 381).  Different from other democratic capitalist political 
economic systems, the extreme rentier economy in Kuwait produces a situation where the large 
level of natural resource wealth weakens the ‘threads of mutual interest’ that often tie together 
wage labor and capital (Herb, 2009).  The Kuwaiti parliament does what it is supposed to, it 
represents the interests of the large number of citizens who rely on public sector jobs.  
 
Another issue related to large scale developments is land ownership. Challenges that arise 
during tourism planning are often related to land ownership issues.  In Kuwait, about 90 percent 
off the country’s real estate is owned by the government (not the ruling family), thus any private 
sector developments that require land, must secure it through government channels. Due to 
questionable development agreements in the past, the land has become “highly politicized” 
(Herb, 2009: 386). The Kuwait Government’s reluctance to sell land has lead to a bureaucratic 
system that restricted access for prospective developers and in some cases, halted approved BOT 
projects as a result of changing legislature and “bureaucratic inaction” (Herb, 2008: 389).  In 
Kuwait, the majority of projects are developed under build, operate, transfer (BOT) mechanisms, 
in which the private sector finances, builds, and operates the developments for a specified time 
period. After this period the entire development is transferred back to the government, and the 
government retains the land title.  While in most countries BOT are employed mostly for 
infrastructure projects, in Kuwait, they are used for almost all large scale projects. More on 
current BOT projects are discussed later in this paper. While some non-infrastructure BOT 
projects have been completed, many others have failed to see any movement because of 
bureaucratic differences. While the private sector wants the government to use oil revenue for 
development projects, the majority of Kuwaitis want to see the government distribute the 
revenues directly to the citizens (Herb, 2009).  
 
One illustration of the impact of these political challenges to development can be seen in 
the turmoil over the Failaka and Bubyian island projects (discussed more later). In 2005 the 
government entity overseeing the development projects, the Dividend Zone Agreements & 
Kuwaiti Islands & Mega Projects Development Team (Dizart), was dissolved and replaced with 
the Mega Projects Agency. The newly formed MPA answers directly to the Ministry of Public 
Works. The dissolution occurred amidst criticism by the nine prequalified investor groups, and 
the lack of necessary political clout to move the projects forward. The MPA, however, is made 
up of the same staff with the same duties, with just a name change (MEED, 2005). 
 
In addition to the issues related directly to the development of major projects and the 
business climate, the parliamentary instability during the last decade has also hampered 
economic reforms and progress on major projects. As a consequence the more economically 
progressive and liberal voices have been marginalized by the election of more conservative 
representatives and the overall popular support for the current system that redistributes the oil 
wealth directly to the citizens. Since 2006, the Emir has used his constitutional power to dissolve 
parliament and call for new elections four times. According to one newspaper editorial (Gulf 
News Editorials, 2008), much of the instability can be attributed to allegations of corruption and 
a continual lack of cooperation between ministers and the opposition-dominated parliament.  
Many in the private sector see the constant political logjams and the ‘snap’ elections as being 
detrimental to the ongoing development projects (Kerr, 2011). The most recent elections in 
February 2012 resulted in the opposition bloc, made up of Sunni Islamist and tribal candidates, 
winning 34 of the 50 seats in parliament. There are fears that the increased power of the Islamist-
Tribal coalition could further destabilize the sectarian harmony. The country’s tribal structure 
and growing Islamism have largely sidelined the more liberal and socially progressive political 
movements in the country and represent two distinct threads of opposition to the Shia ruling elite 
(IISS, 2012). The result of the parliamentary instability has been that the majority of members of 
the opposition, fueled by the public allegations of corruption and lack of transparency by the 
executive branch, could continue to appease popular opinion, and thus interfere with the 
development process including many of the urgently needed infrastructure projects. Additionally, 
mega development projects and economic diversification/liberalization policies have been 
sidetracked due to the infighting between government, parliament, the public and other 
bureaucratic interests groups due to the uniquely democratic political system (Hertog, 2010) 
 
Amidst this political turmoil, the executive branch has spearheaded a series of economic 
reforms in the country, as part of the “Kuwait Vision 2035” plan. These reforms include new 
capital markets, labor and privatization laws, and $115 billion investment undertaken by public 
and private sectors (IISS, 2012). The reform agenda includes several key reforms. The plan 
includes the reduction of the 'red tape' surrounding staring and operating a business, and 
increased access to land and capital for startups. Additionally, the plan supports the auctioning of 
government land and to engage the private sector in the development of public land. The plan 
also calls for increased privatization to reduce public sector employment growth, salaries, and 
expenditures (UK Trade & Investment, 2011).  
 
ECONOMIC REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
 
With oil comprising a majority of the GDP and a climate that does not support much 
agriculture, the diversification of Kuwait’s economy is an important step for future stability. 
While some GCC countries have taken different approaches (i.e., government or private 
funding), all GCC countries have a shared vision of regional growth through economic 
diversification (e.g., manufacturing, health care, education, and tourism) (Rice & Mahmoud, 
1996).  The Kuwait Vision 2035 is a series of 5-year plans through 2035 with the goal of 
transforming “Kuwait into a financial and trade hub for investment, in which the private sector 
leads economic activity, fueled by the spirit of competition, and raising the efficiency of 
production in under a supporting institutional State agency, establishes values, preserves the 
social identity, achieves balanced human development and provides appropriate infrastructure, 
improved legislation and encouraging business environment” (Zawya, 2011).  This plan will 
attempt to remove bureaucratic barriers to the private sector, increase government agency 
effectiveness, and increase access to land, among other high impact reforms (Al-Jazzaf & Al-
Mutairi, 2009).  
 
To accomplish this, Kuwait has proposed several developments in line with the 
government’s 3rd Master Plans. The purpose of Kuwait’s 3rd Master Plan is to define the goals 
and policies for future developments and describe the use of land during the next 30 years 
(Helmy, 2011). The 3rd Master Plan is considered the first phase of the Kuwait Vision 2035 
because it enables legislation and policies to accomplish the vision’s goals. The new policies aim 
to attract more private sector participation, especially in housing development. For example, in 
the past private investors and contractors were not supportive of governmental contracts for 
welfare housing, citing low financial return and government legislation that decreases private 
investments by providing units to welfare participants for free (Helmy, 2011). The 3rd Master 
Plan and sub phases aim to increase private sector participation “by reducing the ownership and 
supervision from the public sector in many economic sectors” (Helmy, 2011: 15). These reforms 
will have a large impact on future tourism developments, as many of the mega projects include 
mix-use facilities combining housing, retail, leisure, and tourism projects.  
 
The most recent phase of the 3rd Master Plan, Kuwait’s Five-Year Plan (2010) includes 
1,100 oil and non-oil economic projects with an estimated cost of $125 billion. These projects 
include hospitals, housing, a highway system, airport improvements, and tourist attractions. To 
balance the high costs and retain ownership, the government will employ, in most cases, the 
“build, operate, transfer” (BOT) mechanism to complete these projects developments. Dictated 
by Kuwait law, BOTs rely on private Kuwait corporations to construct and operate projects with 
an understanding that the infrastructure and operations will be turned over to the government 
after a period of time. BOTs provide a revenue opportunity for private businesses and the 
government benefits from gaining infrastructure and delaying operational costs for 30 to 40 
years. This law is mutually beneficial in some respects, however the ultimate beneficiary is the 
Kuwait government.  Despite the inevitable transfer of operations and infrastructure to the 
government, some private companies (e.g., Injazzat Real Estate Development Company K.S.C.) 
take pride in public good BOT developments. Injazzat believes BOT projects are “advantageous, 
as the private sector clearly possesses the knowledge and ability to deliver projects on time and 
budget” (Injazzat, 2007).  One example of a successful BOT development is the Sulaibiya 
wastewater treatment and reclamation facility; a 30 year contract in operation since 2004, this 
facility secures untreated water provided by the government, treats the wastewater, and then sells 
the treated water back to the government (Al-Otaibi & Abdel-Jawad, 2007).  Projects such as the 
Sulaibiya Treatment facility, however, were under criticism in 2006 when “financial and 
administrative violations” (Al-Qaheri & Al-Mejren, 2009: 330) surfaced and the government 
responded by enacting new regulations on BOT developments in 2008. The past legislature on 
BOT developments led to the private sector’s misuse of public funds and lack of sufficient public 
revenue from projects (Al-Qaheri & Al-Mejren, 2009). There are several issues and obstacles 
that BOT developments face (Helmy, 2011); including, delays due to long documentation cycles, 
lack of human resources with project implementation skills, and lack of vacant land due to 
governmental regulations. In order for Kuwait’s 3rd master plan to become successful, the 
government must consider these challenges and respond with attractive BOT regulations that 
streamline procedures and provides transparency (Helmy, 2011).  Without consideration of the 
previous challenges to the BOT mechanisms, current and future reforms of the economic system 
might fall short of the goals laid out in Kuwait Vision 2035.  
 
To enhance Kuwait’s economy, appearance, and citizen well being the government has 
approved projects such as, the Bubiyan Island Development, the Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah 
bridge expressway, the Jaber Al Ahmed Al Sabah Hospital, and Khairan Residential City. 
Bubiyan Island is Kuwait’s largest island and poised to become a trading hub with the 
development of an international port, a harbor, and residential areas. The new bridge is a 750 
million KD endeavor to connect the developing Silk City with smaller cities on the fringe of 
Kuwait City via an overwater expressway. More citizen-oriented projects include a new hospital 
in Surra with advanced diagnostic and treatment capabilities and the space to accommodate 
1,268 beds. In addition, residential projects such as the Khairan Residential City will provide 
housing for Kuwait’s growing population. This particular residential city is one of the largest 
with 35,844 expected residential units. These developments and others, such as a new university 
campus capable of accommodating 40,000 students, will provide Kuwait and its people with the 
economic tools to compete in the global arena.   
 
Planned Development Projects and the Tourism Industry of Kuwait 
 
The Kuwaiti National Assembly passed a five year development plan that includes a total 
of 1,100 projects, including numerous Mega Projects, totaling an estimated US$125 billion in 
spending (Kuwait Five Year Plan, 2010). The plans main aim is to address economic pressures 
felt since the start of the global economic recession in 2008 by decreasing the country’s 
dependence on oil. Among these projects are several that are aimed at increasing the economic 
revenues of international and domestic tourism. 
 
Within Kuwait’s new Five-Year Plan, there are several large projects that will contribute 
to the country’s growing tourism industry. These developments include, Failaka Island, Madinat 
Al Hareer (or the Silk City), Kuwait International Airport expansions, and projects to beautify 
downtown Kuwait City and Sulaibikhat Beach through developments such as, greening projects, 
a new metro rail system, and “cultural and educational services and facilities, which [will help] 
stimulate both tourism and the economy in the country” (KMC Holding, 2007). The 
beautification projects of downtown Kuwait City and Sulaibikhat Beach have expected values of 
20 million KD and 35 million KD, respectfully. One key tourism development is Madinat Al 
Hareer; a city that will be built from the ground up and projected to be complete by the mid 
2020’s. The other key development is the addition of a new terminal at the Kuwait International 
Airport with construction expected in 2012; the project is planned to be completed in phases over 
the next 30 years (International Airport Review, 2008). 
 
Madinat Al Hareer or the Silk City is an ambitious urban development in Subiya 
expected to take around 25 years to construct. Approved in 2008, construction of highways, 
roads, and support infrastructure has already begun. This $94 billion (USD) development will 
provide 430,000 new jobs and will be home to 750,000 residents, a National Wildlife Sanctuary 
with an eco-tourist resort, a financial center, a duty-free trade zone, a new airport, convention 
facilities, an Olympic stadium and other sports facilities, and the Mubarak Al Kabir Tower 
(which upon completion will be the tallest building in the world with over 200 floors). This 
project also incorporates the Bubiyan port development and the Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah 
Bridge connecting the Silk City with Kuwait City via two man-made islands. The city will 
support four major districts know as, Finance City, Leisure City, Culture City, and Ecological 
City. According to the firm spearheading the Silk City project, these four city centers “match the 
demands of [Kuwait’s] contemporary society for new places to work, relax, learn, and preserve 
the natural heritage of [the] land” (Civic Arts, 2011). Finance City will become a new global 
business, commerce, and trade center. This will be accomplished by its proximity to the planned 
international airport and bridge to Kuwait City, giving global investors easy access to the district. 
Leisure City is located near the estuary of two major rivers providing beaches and waterways for 
leisure pursuits. In addition to vacation attractions such as, resorts, hotels, and rental properties, 
Leisure City will include an athletic center, academies of sports and sports medicine, and 
sporting complexes designed for large-scale international events. Cultural City will rest on the tip 
of the Subiyan peninsula and will give citizens a place for cultural knowledge and academic, 
diplomatic, and policy research, as well as centers for performing arts. Lastly, Ecological City 
will feature the region’s nature preserve, in addition to an ecological research facility. This 
district will also become an ecotourism destination providing views of the desert preserve and 
educational information about the wildlife. Silk City and its surroundings will attract 
international tourists with its innovation and excitement, similar to Abu Dhabi and other Middle 
East destinations.  
 
The completion of the new terminal at Kuwait International Airport outside of Kuwait 
City is expected in 2016. This terminal will have the capacity to service 50 million passengers 
annually, with the first development phase set to accommodate 13 to 25 million annual 
passengers.  Due to the structure’s location and arching design, there will be enough space to 
operate between 30 and 51 gates and jet ways after the first phase of construction. In subsequent 
phases a second passenger terminal will be constructed and the capacity is expected to increase 
to 100 gates and jet ways. To service the new terminals, infrastructure projects such as, new 
roads and access points, two parallel runways, maintenance facilities, hangers, fuel depots, a rail 
system, and an installation of the Kuwaiti Al Mubarak Air Force Base. This terminal will not 
only be flexible enough to accommodate millions of travelers and larger aircraft (i.e., Airbus 
A380), but will also be one of the most environmentally friendly terminals in the world with the 
goal of a “Gold” LEED certification upon completion. With concrete construction, the terminal 
structure will have thermal mass and the roof will utilize photovoltaic cells for terminal 
operations. The terminal will offer lush landscaping to provide aesthetics and comfortable 
microclimates. Curtain buildings such as the parking structure will be incorporated into the 
landscape, adding to the terminal’s natural appearance.  The new terminal at Kuwait 
International Airport will also act as a symbol of economic security and pride for Kuwait’s 
citizens. This project will provide employment opportunities as well as a culturally inspired icon 
for the State of Kuwait.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
All of these developments will provide a huge expansion of the necessary infrastructure 
for growth of the tourism industry in Kuwait. However, the planned development of Failaka 
Island will be the centerpiece in the strategy for Kuwait to emerge as a competitive tourism 
destination. The development plan for Failaka is to create an ‘iconic’ destination that will move 
Kuwait onto a competitive alternative to Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar as a leading destination 
for international long-haul, regional, and domestic tourists.  
 
The development of Failaka Island is an integral part of Kuwait’s future tourism 
development plans. Recent economic reforms provide hope for the success of the Failaka Island 
development, which has been stifled in the past. There have been several development plans for 
the island dating back to the 1960s which have been hampered by the political and economic 
landscape of Kuwait.  The magnitude of the current development also poses a challenge of 
balancing the large-scale development of the island and the preservation of the natural and 
historical richness of the island.  When examined within the context of the overall political and 
economic landscape of Kuwait, the feasibility of these proposed mega projects is questionable, 
as is the future expansion of the tourism industry in Kuwait. 
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